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ABSTRACT
The functioning of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin relies on the open availability of the entire history of its transactions. This makes it
a particularly interesting socio-economic system to analyse from the point of view of network science. Here we analyse the
evolution of the network of Bitcoin transactions between users. We achieve this by using the complete transaction history
from December 5th 2011 to December 23rd 2013. This period includes three bubbles experienced by the Bitcoin price. In
particular, we focus on the global and local structural properties of the user network and their variation in relation to the different
period of price surge and decline. By analysing the temporal variation of the heterogeneity of the connectivity patterns we gain
insights on the different mechanisms that take place during bubbles, and find that hubs (i.e., the most connected nodes) had a
fundamental role in triggering the burst of the second bubble. Finally, we examine the local topological structures of interactions
between users, we discover that the relative frequency of triadic interactions experiences a strong change before, during and
after a bubble, and suggest that the importance of the hubs grows during the bubble. These results provide further evidence
that the behaviour of the hubs during bubbles significantly increases the systemic risk of the Bitcoin network, and discuss the
implications on public policy interventions.
Introduction
Designed under the pseudonymous name of Satoshi Nakamoto, and introduced by a disruptive paper in 20081 while the world
was challenged by the aftermaths of the financial crisis, Bitcoin is in essence a series of cryptographical protocols that solve
the double-spending problem, i.e. prevent the same digital token from being spent more than once, in the absence of a third
party that verifies and guarantees the validity of transactions. More in detail, Bitcoin consists of a decentralized peer-to-peer
network, composed by users that transact bitcoins among them; once it is validated by a network of miners according to the
consensus rules that are part of the protocol, these transactions are included in a public and distributed transactional database, the
blockchain ledger2–4. Few years after the date of its release, this digital currency has showed to be able to attract an increasing
number of users, both because of speculative reasons5–7, and because of the trust of early adopters in the potentialities of
this innovative technology8, 9. In fact, the number of users and ergo the number of transactions within the bitcoin network
has witnessed a remarkable burst which also has lead to an increment on its value in the market and consequently to some
price bubbles and respective crashes10–12; on the other hand, the novelties introduced by the bitcoin protocol have allowed a
numerous number of innovative analyses and make the bitcoin network a particularly interesting case of study13. Indeed, a
remarkable feature of the transaction verification mechanism on which bitcoin system relies on is that the transaction history
since the creation of the currency is openly accessible. The availability of the complete transaction history allows to investigate
the structural properties of the network of bitcoin users and to examine their relations with its different growing phases. The
structure and dynamics of the network of bitcoin users has only recently started to be investigated. Looking at the network
of transactions between addresses, Kondor et al.14 have shown that the in-degree distribution of nodes, i.e. the number of
incoming transactions of nodes, relates with nodes wealth distribution. Parino et al.15 have investigated the network of the
international bitcoin flow to identify socio-economic factors driving its adoption by country.
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Bubble Start End
1 2012-05-25 2012-08-18
2 2013-01-03 2013-04-11
3 2013-10-07 2013-11-23
Table 1. Time intervals of the three Bitcoin bubbles occurring between May 2012 and January 201411.
Here, we reconstruct the network of transaction between users by merging addresses apparently owned by different users
making it closer to reality than the raw network of addresses16, 17. We study the evolution of the network global quantities, such
as the variation coefficient of the degree distributions, the sizes of the largest strongly and weakly connected components and
we also investigate the evolution of the local structure of the networks by examining so-called network motifs18. Network motif,
defined as statistically recurrent subgraphs, were shown to implement simple functionalities that contribute to the complex
behaviour of the system as a whole18. This modular organization at the local scale was also shown to be common to a wide
range of real networks19. In particular, the abundance of certain triadic motifs has been identified as a early-warning signal for
topological collapse of inter-banking networks20.
Results
Evolution of global network measures
To be able to detect patterns occurring at different time scales, we construct two time series of networks, using a integration
time of one day and one week respectively. We refer to Wheatley et al. 2018.11 to identify the start and end date of the various
bubbles and focus on the three first bubbles, reported in Table 1. Our observation period starts 5 months before the onset of the
first bubble, namely on December 5th 2011, and finishes on December 23rd 2013, one month after the burst of the last bubble
taken into account.
We explored the evolution of several network properties that can be relevant to highlight events that might be related to
irrational exuberance of agents in the market or to crisis triggering phenomena such as liquidity imbalances. The following
measures are defined:
• Number of nodes (wallets) in the network Bubbles are characterised by a rising number of active users, especially at the
end of the critical period.
• Size of largest strongly and weakly Connected Components.
• Ratio between the (total, in/out) degree of the most connected and second most connected node, dubbed as “Degree Gap
Ratio”.
• Ratio between the in and out degree of the most connected node, dubbed as “Hub in/out Degree Ratio”.
As a first step we analyse the time series of the number of active users alongside the price evolution (Fig 1a), aggregated at
the weekly time scale, which shows the strong correlation between the two, especially during bubble periods. This is easily
explained by the herding feedback mechanism10, where an initial price hike is followed by an increased popularity of the
asset that lures more users into the market. The increase in activity of typically buying users (since they are getting into the
market) further boosts the growth of price which eventually grows at unsustainable rate and collapses, either because of growth
slowdown that triggers speculators to sell or after some negative news release that leads to panic sales.
Next we try to quantify how central are the most connected nodes in the circulation of money and whether their centrality in
the network of transactions is related or not to the price surge and fall. To do so, we compute the size of the largest Strongly
Connected Component (SCC) and Weakly Connected Component (WCC), namely the largest set of vertices that have a path
running between them in both directions, for the SCC, and in at least one direction for the WCC. We make this analysis on the
full network and on the networks where the most connected (SCCm1, WCCm1) and the two most connected nodes (SCCm2,
WCCm2) are removed from the network with all of their edges. This would highlight the role of the largest and second largest
hubs as intermediaries in the market. In particular the WCC is relevant to show if there are some fractions of the economy that
never interact with others or that do so only through one of the two hubs, while the SCC can be an indicator of how efficiently a
bitcoin can pass from one end to the other of the network and how this happens thanks to hubs. We plot these indicators in Fig
1b, 1c. We see how the vast majority of users are always connected to the network since the largest WCC includes almost all
nodes. However, the importance of the first hub changes throughout the time period we consider, decreasing in time and in
particular during the first bubble. We see that the first bubble eliminates a second important hub (WCCm1), and this could be
2/10
Figure 1. Bitcoin network and price evolution. The measures are performed on networks reconstructed each week. The
three bubbles are indicated by a shaded area (from onset until burst day). a) Number of active users, i.e. number of nodes in the
networks, as a function of time (blue) and Bitcoin price in USD (green). b) Size of the largest weakly connected component
(WCC) of the full network divided by the total number of nodes (blue), largest weakly connected component after the removal
of the highest degree node (WCCm1, orange) and the removal of the two nodes with highest degree (WCCm2, green). c)
Similar measure than in b) but using the largest strongly connected component instead of the largest weakly connected
component.
related to the unmasking of the Ponzi scheme behind Bitcoins Savings & Trust11 who might have been that player. After that
event, the centrality of the first hub stabilises in the WCC and no other node has similar importance in that almost 20% of nodes
are connected to the market only through it.
Similar conclusions on the centrality of the first hub come from the gap between the SCC and SCCm1 which is again close
to 20% of the total nodes in the network. The circulation of money in the network rises as time goes on, and after the first
bubble the first hub, although very central, is not any more the only passage point. This is a signal that smaller nodes start
trading among themselves without relying only on the intermediation of the large exchange (likely Mt. Gox) and the velocity of
money through the network is not completely hindered if the first hub goes in distress thanks to these secondary channels. It is
interesting to notice that this doesn’t happen at the expense of the importance of the first hub, which is indeed increasing its
centrality, and neither through the formation of a secondary hub, since the second largest node is irrelevant to the size of the
SCC and WCC.
However, we do not find consistent signals fore-running bubble onsets or bursts in these global measures. This could be related
to the developing nature of the market, which is in constant evolution and for which these global features undergo such big
changes that even comparing between time frames is extremely hard. We thus turn to more microscopic measures, and expose
the results in the next section.
Heterogeneity measures
In this section we examine several measures of heterogeneity for three distributions, namely the in-degree, out-degree and total
degree. Specifically, we use a daily aggregation windows for network and cover two years of transactions, from January 2012 to
December 31st 2013. For each type of network and distribution, we compute the variation coefficient, i.e., V = σx¯ , where σ and
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Figure 2. Degree gap ratios of the two largest hubs. The three bubbles are indicated by shaded area (from onset until burst
day). a) Ratio of the in-degree of the two nodes with highest in-degree. b) Ratio of the out-degree of the two nodes with highest
out-degree. c) Ratio of the total degree of the two nodes with highest total degree. d) Ratio of in-degree over out-degree for the
largest hub.
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Figure 3. Heterogeneity evolution of the degree distributions. Variation coefficient of the in-degree (blue), out-degree
(orange) and total degree (green) distributions of daily networks. The bubbles are indicated by the pink shaded areas (from
onset until burst day).
x¯ are the standard deviation and the average of the empirical distribution, respectively. As all the distributions display heavy
tails, this measure of heterogeneity may depends on the size of the networks. To account for the varying size of the networks at
every point in time, we build the distributions only considering Nsample = 1784 nodes for each daily network, where Nsample is
the number of nodes the smallest network possesses, and measure the average value of V over 100 random sample for each
distribution. Our results, displayed in Figure 3, show that during the second bubble, which occurred between January 3rd 2013
and April 11th 2013, the in-degree distribution becomes far more homogeneous than before the bubble, whereas the out-degree
distribution exhibit a surge of heterogeneity.
Fig. 2 shows the relative degrees of the largest and second largest hub, as well as the out-degree-in-degree ratio of the
largest hub. Specifically, the latter measure suggests that the largest hub lowers the number of people it buys from with respect
to the number of people it sells to, which is expected during a bubble, since more and more low-degree nodes enter the market
following the price surge (see Fig. 1). Interestingly, figures 2 (a) and 2 (b) show that the the in-degree (out-degree) of the largest
hub grows (decreases) with respect to that of the second largest hub, suggesting that the second largest hub follows a similar
dynamics to that of the largest hub, but to a greater extent. Indeed, these results suggest that, during the second bubble, the
second largest hub increases the number of customers it sells to, whereas it lowers the number of customers it buys from. It is
worth noting that this is purely a structural change, since the largest hub keeps a null trade balance throughout this period.
These structural changes are consistent with the changes in the heterogeneity of the in-degree and out-degree distributions,
and suggest that there are two hubs that centralise the market by selling bitcoins to most of the traders that enter the market
during the bubble, resulting in a significant increase of the systemic risk. Indeed, if only a few hubs account for most of the
transactions in the network, if at any point in time one of them fails, the whole network may crash. This is exactly what
happened on April 10th 2013, when Mt Gox, the major Bitcoin exchange, broke under the high trading volume, triggering the
burst of the bubble.
Triadic motifs analysis
Triadic motifs, i.e. all the possible directed patterns connecting three vertices, are the natural generalizations of directed
clustering coefficients and the starting point for the understanding of a complex network self-organization in communities.
Thirteen, non-isomorphic, triadic directed patterns (reported in Fig. 6) can be identified and classified. Given a real, binary,
directed matrix A, the motifs occurrences Nm can be written as reported in table 2.
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Motif m Nm
1 ∑i 6= j 6=k(1−ai j)a jia jk(1−ak j)(1−aik)(1−aki)
2 ∑i6= j 6=k ai j(1−a ji)a jk(1−ak j)(1−aik)(1−aki)
3 ∑i6= j 6=k ai ja jia jk(1−ak j)(1−aik)(1−aki)
4 ∑i 6= j 6=k(1−ai j)(1−a ji)a jk(1−ak j)aik(1−aki)
5 ∑i 6= j 6=k(1−ai j)a jia jk(1−ak j)aik(1−aki)
6 ∑i6= j 6=k ai ja jia jk(1−ak j)aik(1−aki)
7 ∑i6= j 6=k ai ja ji(1−a jk)ak j(1−aik)(1−aki)
8 ∑i6= j 6=k ai ja jia jkak j(1−aik)(1−aki)
9 ∑i 6= j 6=k(1−ai j)a ji(1−a jk)ak jaik(1−aki)
10 ∑i6= j 6=k(1−ai j)a jia jkak jaik(1−aki)
11 ∑i6= j 6=k ai j(1−a ji)a jkak jaik(1−aki)
12 ∑i 6= j 6=k ai ja jia jkak jaik(1−aki)
13 ∑i 6= j 6=k ai ja jia jkak jaikaki
Table 2. Classification and definitions of the triadic motifs abundances.
Figure 4. Frequency evolution of the 13 triadic motifs.
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The three upper panels of Figure 4 show the density of the 13 triadic motifs during three periods that have been chosen
to monitor the system before, during and after the bubble happening in the period of time from December 5th 2011 until
September 18th 2012, taken on weekly aggregated networks. The three lower panels of Figure 4 show the z-scores of the same
motifs.
Upon visually inspecting the three upper panels, it is apparent that the bubble is indeed characterised by motifs profiles that
differ from both the previous and the following period. It is apparent that the same motifs (i.e. 1, 3, 6) are overrepresented
during the three periods: upon inspecting these three kinds of motifs, we see that they are constituted by a basic unit of two
non-reciprocated dyads. We suspect these to characterise the topological structure of the hubs, reflecting a huge selling activity
in all periods. This is particularly evident, however, when considering the pre-bubble period from December 5th 2011 until May
25th 2012: this evidence leads us to assume that monitoring the hubs connectivity may be useful to detect upcoming critical
activity.
These structural changes are consistent with the changes in the heterogeneity of the in-degree and out-degree distributions,
and suggest that there are two hubs that centralise the market by selling bitcoins to most of the traders that enter the market
during the bubble, resulting in a significant increase of the systemic risk. Indeed, if only a few hubs account for most of the
transactions in the network, if at any point in time one of them fails, the whole network may crash.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyse the impact of structural properties of the Bitcoin transaction network on the generation and crash of
bubbles in the exchange with respect to fiat currencies. Specifically, we examine network features such as heterogeneity of the
degree distributions and frequency of connectivity patterns (i.e., motifs). We find significant changes in these properties during
the period of price bubbles. A more detailed analysis unveils that, during the first bubble, the frequency of motifs indicating the
relationship hubs have with new, low-degree users changes significantly; this suggests that hubs take an even more important
role in becoming liquidity providers. These results are confirmed in the second bubble: There, by analysing the heterogeneity
of the in-degree, out-degree, and total degree distributions, we find that there is a significant widening (narrowing) of the
out-degree (in-degree) distributions, whereas the total degree does not change its distribution significantly. By performing
additional analyses on the two largest hubs, we find that these structural changes - similar to what is observed during the first
bubble - is likely to be caused by the centralising role hubs take on as liquidity providers.
Although we find that measures can explain well some price bubbles but not others, these results highlight that tracking
properties of hubs in the transaction network is key for understanding the underlying mechanisms of a bubble. Moreover, at
least in the first three Bitcoin bubbles, the behaviour of hubs significantly increased the systemic risk of the Bitcoin economy,
eventually leading to systemic failure and sudden price crashes.
These results also suggest that Bitcoin bubbles are difficult to forecast, but can be prevented, or at least alleviated, by
introducing policies that aim at reducing the importance of large hubs in the network. In future work, we plan to extend our
analysis by introducing new structural measures and by covering all the bubbles that happened to date.
Methods
User network reconstruction
An element of the Bitcoin protocol is that it attempts to preserve anonymity of users in a way that is better defined as
pseudonimity: transactions take place without the need of a third party and users cannot be directly linked to real users or to an
identity3. A transaction, thus, does not identify the payer or the payee in any way. However, by exploiting the properties of
the protocol, like the fact that the transaction history is publicly available, it is possible to trace and cluster addresses that are
owned by the same user, collapsing in that way a network of addresses into a network of users. The principle that drove our
approach is to minimise as much as possible the number of false positives, that is, the addresses that are linked together as if
they were owned by the same user but they are not. The approach is based on two heuristics introduced by Meiklejohn et al.17,
that we describe here.
Input-based Heuristic: The first and safest one exploits the fact that, in principle, if two addresses are input of the same
transaction, then they are controlled by the same user. This property is also transitive, which means that if a transaction includes
in the input the addresses A and B, and a second transaction includes the addresses B and C, then it is safe to assume that A,B,C
addresses belong to the same user.
One-time change addresses: the second one detects addresses appearing in the output of a transaction and that can be
attributed to the owner of the inputs.
In our work we adopt the first heuristic, but we modify the second one, as in the working paper by Tessone16, with the aim
of using the second heuristic only in the case in which it is safe to assume that the one-time change address belongs to the
owner of the inputs.
7/10
Figure 5. An illustrative example of the construction of the network. Nodes, corresponding to users, are connected by
directed edges, corresponding to transactions. Edges are annotated with the total amount of transactions occurred and the total
quantity of bitcoins transferred during the observation window.
Others techniques use different approaches21–24, where the one-time change addresses are defined using similar heuristics.
Another approach, proposed by Cazabet et al.25, is based on a combination of the input-based heuristic and of the Louvain
community detection algorithm to detect addresses that are likely to belong to the same user. The reason why we did not use
these methods is that we privileged the heuristics preserving the analysis from errors in detecting addresses not belonging to the
same users as if they were controlled by a single entity, i.e. avoiding false positives.
Note that these techniques do not allow to reproduce the perfect network of users, since real users can use different wallets
that not necessarily are linked together by a transaction; thus, the reader should not consider the network obtained as a perfect
representation of the real network of users, but as an approximation that clusters addresses minimizing the presence of false
positives.
Once the addresses are grouped by wallet, we build the network in the following way: two nodes (wallets) i and j are connected
via a directed edge (i,j) if at least one transaction from i to j occurs during the considered time integration window. Edges are
annotated with the number of transactions occurred and the total quantity of bitcoins transferred. The structure of the network
is illustrated with an example in Figure 5.
Null models
In order to verify the statistical significance of our results we have compared them with a properly-defined null model. Inspired
by the empirical regularities of the degree distribution we have employed the Directed Random Grapg Model (DRGM). It is an
Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) defined within the constrained Shannon entropy-maximization framework. Briefly
speaking, one solves the following problem
max
P
{
S[P]−∑
i
θi
[
∑
A
P(A)X(A)− X¯i
]}
(1)
where the vector of constraints reads ~C(A) = {~kout ,kin} andC0 = 〈C0〉= 1 sums up the normalization condition of the searched
probability distribution. The solution to the problem above reads
P(A) =
e−H(A,~θ)
Z(~θ)
(2)
with H(A,~θ) = ~θ · ~C summing up the proper topological constraints. In the DRGM case, our Hamiltonian reads with
H(A,θ)≡ θL a position leading to the probability function
P(A) = pL(1− p)N(N−1)−L (3)
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Figure 6. The 13 possible triadic motifs involving three connected vertices20.
with p e
−θ
1+e−θ ≡ x1+x . The comparison between observed and expected properties on the ensemble has been carried out by
employing the z-score index, defined as
zX =
NX − X¯
σX
; (4)
in our case, X represents the abundance of the triadic motifs shown in fig. 6. The z-score is a standardised variable
measuring the difference between the observed and the expected value in units of standard deviation. If X is normally
distributed under the null model, then values within z=±1, z=±2, z=±3 would (approximately) occur with a 68%, 95%,
99% probability respectively. If the observed value of X corresponds to a large positive (negative) value of zX then the quantity
X is over(under)-represented in the data, and not explained by the null model.
A simpler analysis discounting the increasing volume of the network is obtained by considering the index Nˆm = NmN , i.e. by
dividing the abundance of a given motif m by the total number of nodes in a particular snapshot.
Motifs detection
An exact counting of the network motifs present in the reconstructed networks of transactions was performed, on a reduced set
of 17 time points in the period of the first bitcoin bubble. The 13 three-node network motifs analysed are the same ones as
those described by Squartini et al.20 and are represented in Fig. 6. Null models are built for each time point with the procedure
described above. The expected number of network motifs X¯ and their standard deviation σX are henceforth obtained, allowing
us to calculate the z-score (equation 4).
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